Monday, August 26, 2019

Can the Psychological Contract Be Considered a ‘Contract’?



This issue, as to whether the concept of a psychological contract can be constituted as a ‘contract’, In legal terms, the notation of a contract implies an agreement or at least the outward appearance of an agreement. Yet, given that the psychological contract is oriented towards subjective perceptions – or as Rousseau (1995, 6) has stated ‘agreement is in the eye of the beholder’ – the potential for reaching such agreement or finding the “zone of acceptance’ is inherently problematic. To put it another way, it is very difficult to pin down precisely at what point the psychological contract might be successfully negotiated (Guest 2004a). Indeed, this problem is even more pertinent if the contract is viewed as some form of ongoing process (Herriot and Pemberton 1997).

In contrast to the psychological contract, a legal contract is one that is more formal, written down and verbalized between the two parties. This suggests that both parties have read and agreed to its terms and conditions. In such an instance, this type of contract becomes quite difficult to change without some degree of consent between the contacting parties Guest (1998). As the literature on psychological contracting illustrates, however, it is not subject to such contractual restrictions, because it has been exclusively constructed through the individual’s unvoiced expectations and subjective feelings (Rousseau 1995). As a result, there is very little to prevent it from being casually and secretly changed by either party.

In addition, there are further doubts surrounding the legitimacy of the term ‘contract’ being subsumed into an unvoiced social exchange interaction (Cooke et al. 2004). At face value, we often accept that works and managers of an organization enter into a contract agreement, more often than not when starting a new job. However, it can be extremely unclear as to whom the parties to such an agreement are. This is because we regard the worker and the organization as easily identifiable and recognizable entries, which is in fact not always the case. Particularly in a large organization, employees are likely to come into contract with a wide range of organizational agents, creating what Setton et al. (1996) have referred to as ‘multiple exchanges’. Clearly, it would seem unlikely that each of these agents will provide employees with exactly the same expectations. This leads to a rather ambiguous position in conceptualizing which organizational agents are likely to be the most prominent or influential in constructing different expectations (Setton et al. 1996).

Furthermore, the notation of making a contract with an organization is made increasingly difficult, given the increased use of non-standard forms of employment, such as in the case of agency works or multi-site employers. In many instances, it is often unclear as to who the actual employing organization might be (Rubery et al. 2004). The blurring of organizational boundaries and the development of multi-employer relationships has a number of implications for the management of human resources and the construction of psychological contracts. For example, Cooke st al. (2004) provide an instance of airport baggage handlers who identify strongly with the airline they work for (Airline D), even though they are legally employed by an outside agency contractor. In spite of the fact that employees were not actually employed by the airline, worker felt committed to it because they saw their position as a temporary stepping-stone towards gaining permanent employment. Indeed, many baggage handlers actively portrayed themselves as airline employees and, in some cases, sought to hide their true identity by hiding their actual employer’s ID badge from boarding passengers. The apparent ambivalence towards their actual employer was made explicit by one baggage handler who commented: ‘Our commitment will be to Airline D because if they think we are not good enough, then we have to go back to FH (their employer)’ (Cooke st al. 2004, 188).

In relation to the construction of a psychological contract, the above illustrates the contradictions for employees receiving and subsequently interpreting managerial messages about their expectations and obligations, particularly when employees identify less with their actual employer and more with a client organization for whom they perform day-to-day tasks.

There are further limitations with the use of the concept of contract. As discussed above, a contract implies that the parties have entered into an agreement freely and equally, and, in legal terms, the agreement cannot be changed without some consent between the two contracting parties. However, this is a flawed assumption. Employment contracts are rarely made between equals, nor are they explicitly negotiated and agreed in the same way as buying a house or a car. In entering into a relationship with an employer, for the majority of employees, it means that they become subordinate to their employers’ power and authority, because it is employers who control and direct the productive resources of the enterprise (Fox 1974). In many instances, it is employers who determine the rate of pay, the pace of work and what benefits are offered in exchange for the employees’ physical and mental labour.

If an imbalance of power is inherent in explicit, legal contracts, the privilege of employers to direct and distribute resources as they see fit is magnified for an implicit set of expectations that the psychological contract seeks to capture. When we consider this imbalance of power between management and employee and its implications for how unvoiced expectations are supposed to be communicated and understood, it is perhaps not surprising that authors find increasing contract violation (Morrison and Robinson 1997). It is perhaps time that the psychological contract should be recognized for what it is: a social exchange interaction.


References

Cooke, F.L., Hebson, G. and Carroll, M. (2004). Commitment and identity across organizational boundaries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fox, A. (1974). Beyond Contract. Work, Power and Trust Relations. London: Faber & Faber.

Guest, D. (1998). Is the psychological contract worth taking seriously? Journal of organizational Behaviour.

Herriot, P.and Pemberton, C. (1997). Facilitating new deals. Human Resource Management Journal.

Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. L. (1997). When Employees Feel Betrayed: A Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops. Academy of Management Review.

Rousseau, D. (1995). Psychological Contracts in Organisations: Understanding the Written and Unwritten Agreements.

Rubery, J., Earnshaw, J. and Marchington, M. (20014). Blurring the boundaries to the employment relationship: from single to multi-employer relationships. In Marchington, M., Grimshaw, D., Rubery, J. and Willmott, H. (eds), Fragmenting Work: Blurring Organisational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Setton, R., Bennett, N. and Liden, R. (1996). Social exchange in organisations: perceived organisation support, leader-member exchange and employee reciprocity. Journal Applied Psychology.



The Psychological Contract defined

The concept of psychological contract was first put forward by Argyris(1960), a famous American behavioral scientist, he talked about the...